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ACCESS TO COURTS AND PREEMPTION
OF STATE REMEDIES IN COLLECTIVE
ACTION PERSPECTIVE
Richard E. Levy† and Robert L. Glicksman‡
The extent to which federal law may preempt state common law
tort remedies, thereby limiting litigants’ access to court, is an
increasingly important issue.1 Businesses that produce and sell
products increasingly assert preemption defenses against product
liability and related lawsuits by injured consumers based on
†
J.B. Smith Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Kansas School
of Law. We thank the participants in the session on “Access to the Courts in the Roberts Era”
held on January 30, 2009 at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law for the helpful
feedback they provided at the presentation of this article.
‡
J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
1 The issue gained added urgency with the Supreme Court’s decision in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), which held that a savings clause in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 explicitly exempting common law tort
remedies from the effect of the Act’s express preemption provision did not prevent application
of the implied preemption doctrine. Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). See infra notes 89–99 (discussing the implications of
Wyeth for our analysis). Other recent examples of cases addressing these issues are legion. See,
e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (holding that the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act neither explicitly nor implicitly preempted claim of alleged
violation of state unfair trade practices act in connection with marketing of light cigarettes);
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that patient’s common-law claims of
negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty against manufacturer of catheter were
preempted by FDA premarket approval process); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51
(2002) (holding that plaintiff’s claim based on failure to install propeller guards on boat engine
was not preempted by the Federal Boat Safety Act or the Coast Guard’s decision not to adopt
regulation requiring propeller guards); Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding that worker’s products liability claim was not preempted by OSHA requirements for
rollover protective structures for material-handling equipment); Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that federal aviation regulations preempted claim based
on failure to warn of the risk of forming blood clots from remaining seated in a pressurized
cabin for a long duration); Richardson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1073
(E.D. Wis. 2008) (holding that Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not
impliedly preempt state law).
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regulations establishing health and/or safety standards that apply to
their products.2 At the same time, political and legal developments
have made it more difficult to adopt strong health and safety
regulations.3 Thus, preemption of state tort remedies may lock in
weak federal regulations, prevent states from protecting citizens, and
leave consumers without adequate recourse against dangerous or
unhealthy products. Nonetheless, there may be good reasons for
federal law to be designed or construed so as to preempt state
remedies.
“Remedial preemption” raises fundamental questions about the
proper allocation of authority between the federal and state
governments and about the role of courts in interpreting statutes and
providing remedies for those who suffer injuries.4 At bottom,
remedial preemption cases present the same basic questions, even if
the answers to those questions will inevitably vary depending on the
specific federal statutes and state remedies at issue. Developing a
workable framework for analyzing remedial preemption issues can
therefore help to ensure an appropriate accommodation of the federal
and state interests at stake and promote consistent application of
preemption doctrine to state judicial remedies.
In a previous article, we developed a “collective action”
framework for preemption analysis and applied it to the issue of state
environmental regulations addressing the problem of global climate
change.5 In this contribution to the symposium, we apply that
approach to the issue of remedial preemption. Our analysis suggests
that while remedial preemption may be justified in some cases, courts
should not lightly infer remedial preemption unless: (1) a primary
purpose of the federal law is to ensure uniform standards to promote
2 See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 44–45 (2006) (discussing
emergence of federal preemption as a prominent field of study and attributing heightened
interest in the field to, among other things, “the increased resort of [business] defendants to
federal preemption defenses”). Industry reliance on federal regulation as a defense to state
remedies reflects a certain degree of irony insofar as these same defendants often opposed the
adoption of statutes or promulgation of regulations on which they now rely. A prominent
example of this phenomenon concerns tobacco warnings.
3 See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 580–84 (2008) (discussing political and legal developments
that have led to an era of “regulatory skepticism”).
4 We use the term, “remedial preemption,” for purposes of convenience to refer to federal
preemption of state judicial remedies for injured plaintiffs. Our primary concern here is with
monetary remedies available in state tort law causes of action (particularly products liability
actions), but remedies also may be available for causes of action based on state contract (such as
breach of warranty) or property law.
5 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3.
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free movement of goods, prevent the export of regulatory burdens by
“downstream” states, or solve a not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY)
problem; and (2) there is strong evidence that state judicial remedies
(as opposed to direct state regulation through legislation or the actions
of administrative agencies) would interfere with the achievement of
those goals. In addition, we conclude that preemption of one common
law cause of action does not necessarily warrant preemption of
different causes of action for remediation of the same injury. Finally,
we argue that courts should be especially reluctant to read the
preemptive effect of federal law so as to leave injured persons without
any remedy whatsoever.
Our argument proceeds in three parts. Part I of the Article
describes the basic collective action framework for analyzing
remedial preemption issues. This discussion identifies important
differences among various kinds of preemption, develops the essential
premises of our framework, and considers the kinds of federal
purposes that might justify preemption of more stringent state health
and safety regulation. Part II of the Article applies this framework to
the problem of remedial preemption, with particular attention to the
ways in which state judicial remedies differ from state regulation by
means of statutes or administrative rules, including the differences
between legislatures and courts, between legislative rules and judicial
decisions, and among possible preemptive effects on judicial
remedies. Part III analyzes how the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision6
holding that state tort remedies based on failure-to-warn claims were
not preempted by federal regulation of the content of warning labels
for drugs comports with our analysis. A final section summarizes our
conclusions and their implications.
I. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PREEMPTION
In this part of the Article, we articulate the basic elements of our
collective action framework for preemption and its application to
remedial preemption issues. We begin by drawing some basic
distinctions among certain kinds of preemption that prove useful in
focusing the issues. We then identify the basic premises of our
approach, including a strong presumption against preemption, the
central role of federal statutory purposes in preemption analysis, and
the relevance of collective action principles in understanding the
significance of federal statutory purposes for preemption analysis.
Finally, we consider the kinds of federal purposes that might support
6

Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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preemption of state judicial remedies that effectively impose more
stringent health and safety standards on defendants.
A. Types of Preemption
As an initial matter, it is important to clarify some basic
distinctions that we will use throughout the discussion. The first
distinction is between preemption as a result of a “direct conflict”
between state and federal law, on the one hand, and preemption that
occurs because federal law “displaces” state authority in a given area,
on the other. The second is a distinction between what may be called
“floor” preemption and “ceiling” preemption.
1. Direct Conflicts vs. Displacement of State Authority
Traditional preemption doctrine distinguishes between express and
implied preemption, and between two kinds of implied preemption,
federal occupation of the field and conflict preemption.7 Under this
traditional analysis, implied occupation of the field arises when
federal regulation is so pervasive and federal interests are so
dominant that state law is completely preempted in the entire field.
Conflict preemption arises either when it is impossible to comply
with both federal and state law, or when the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the
federal law.
The distinction between direct conflict preemption and
displacement preemption is similar to, but different from, the
traditional distinction between “conflict” preemption and “occupation
of the field” preemption. Direct conflict preemption applies not only
when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law, but
also when the state law, on its face, creates a direct and clear conflict
with federal law.8 Thus, direct conflict preemption is broader than the
“impossibility of compliance” strand of conflict preemption, but
narrower than the “obstacle to the accomplishment of federal
objectives” strand.9 For example, if a state permit allowed the
7 See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and
the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1114 (2007) (referring to “the now-standard categories of
occupation of the field preemption and conflict preemption” (footnotes omitted)); Mary J.
Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181,
199–200 (2004); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-Emption Presumption That Never Was: PreEmption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1383–84 (1998).
8 See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260–61 (2000)
(advocating a “logical-contradiction test”).
9 In Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the majority rejected an impossibility of
compliance argument, stressing that “[i]mpossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” Id.
at 1199.
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dumping of toxic waste in violation of federal law, there would be a
direct conflict and federal law would preempt the permit, which could
not serve as a defense to an enforcement action based on the federal
violation (absent an express savings provision).10
Displacement of state authority operates more broadly to prevent
the state from exercising its authority in a particular regulatory area or
manner, and includes not only traditional field preemption, but also
the broad application of the strand of conflict preemption based on an
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes or objectives.
Thus, for example, if federal law strikes a careful balance between
regulatory burdens and health benefits, state laws imposing more
stringent regulations might stand as an obstacle to the purpose of
striking this balance, even if the requirements for federal occupation
of the field are not met. In such a case, state regulatory authority is
displaced broadly.
When there is a direct conflict between federal and state law, the
superiority of federal law follows directly from the Supremacy Clause
(whether or not it is possible to comply with both).11 To illustrate the
difference between direct conflicts and displacement, suppose that a
federal agency adopts health and safety regulations governing the
operation of power plants. Even if the federal regulations include
standards for siting power plants, preemption of state and local zoning
authority would require a strong showing of congressional intent to
10 Although the conflict between state and federal law is clear and direct, this conflict
would not fall within the impossibility of compliance strand of conflict preemption because the
regulated party could comply with both federal and state law by electing not to exercise the
permit. In his concurring opinion in Wyeth, Justice Thomas argued in favor of an approach
similar to ours, noting that the Court “has not explained why a narrow ‘physical impossibility’
standard is the best proxy for determining when state and federal laws ‘directly conflict’ for
purposes of the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 1209 (Thomas, J., concurring). He went on to observe
that “if federal law gives an individual the right to engage in certain behavior that state law
prohibits, the laws would give contradictory commands notwithstanding the fact that an
individual could comply with both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior.” Id. Justice
Thomas rejected other forms of implied conflict preemption altogether as an improper judicial
extension of statutes. See id. at 1205 (“I write separately, however, because I cannot join the
majority’s implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrines. In particular, I
have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption
jurisprudence.”). We are sympathetic to Justice Thomas’s position, although we are not
prepared at this point to advocate the complete rejection of displacement of state authority based
on the “obstacle” strand of federal preemption. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 591
n.56. At a minimum, there should be very strong evidence of congressional intent to oust state
law to support implied displacement of state authority.
11 Thus, for example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819), the
Court held that taxation of a national bank was preempted by federal law even though it was
possible for the national bank to comply with the state law by paying the tax. See Glicksman &
Levy, supra note 3, at 588 n.44. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994) (distinguishing between “supremacy” and
“preemption” and arguing that preemption is not justified by the Supremacy Clause, but rather
by the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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displace that authority, given the traditional control that states and
localities have had over land use decisions. But if the federal agency
issued a permit approving the location of a particular proposed power
plant, that permit would preempt application of even a pre-existing
zoning law (such as one that permits only residential use at the
location of the proposed plant) to block construction of the plant. The
zoning law would be in direct conflict with the federal permit, even
though it would be possible to comply with both sets of laws by not
building the plant.12
By way of contrast, field preemption, or a broad conclusion that
certain general categories of state regulation stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the object and purpose of federal law,
effectively displaces state authority to act in a given area.13 It is the
displacement of state authority to provide judicial remedies that
concerns us here. This sort of displacement, which rests on the
conclusion that the retention of state regulatory authority is
inconsistent with the purposes of federal law, represents a significant
interference with the interests of states.
2. Floor and Ceiling Preemption
A second distinction that informs our approach is the distinction
between “floor” and “ceiling” preemption, which we borrow from
William Buzbee.14 As the terms suggest, floor preemption occurs
when federal law sets a minimum standard of regulation or protection,
establishing a floor that state laws cannot lower, but leaving states the
option of providing more stringent protections. In the context of state
and federal remedies, floor preemption would prevent compliance
with a less stringent state law from operating as a defense to a federal
remedy for violation of federal law. Floor preemption would not
impose any restrictions, however, on state remedies that offer greater
12 To borrow the terminology of Thomas Merrill, this sort of preemption means that
federal law “trumps” state law, but does not displace state authority to enact laws in the area.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730–31
(2008) (explaining that displacement “occurs when state law in a particular area is nullified or
wiped out, leaving federal law as the sole source of legal obligation,” while trumping “occurs
when the wiping out or displacement of federal law by state law is prohibited”).
13 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (holding action
alleging defective design of automobile because of the absence of a driver’s side airbag was
preempted because it conflicted with the objectives of a safety standard issued by the
Department of Transportation under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
even though the suit was not covered by the statute’s express preemption clause).
14 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007). Both the Supreme Court and the
FDA used this terminology in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193, 1199–1200 (2009). See
infra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting examples).
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protection than those provided by federal law. Floor preemption is the
norm with federal health and safety standards, and would seem to
follow inherently from the federal action imposing a minimum
standard.15
Ceiling preemption, on the other hand, precludes states from
adopting more stringent or protective regulations. Remedial
preemption presents issues of ceiling, rather than floor preemption.
The essential argument for remedial preemption is that state remedies
are a form of regulation that effectively impose higher regulatory
standards than those imposed by federal law. Note that remedial
preemption thus raises two distinct questions: whether federal law
should be interpreted as having ceiling preemptive effect on more
stringent regulatory standards; and, if so, whether state judicial
remedies should be understood as imposing such standards.
B. Basic Premises
Our framework for preemption analysis rests on three basic
premises. First, we believe that there should be a strong presumption
against remedial preemption. Second, we argue that, in the absence of
explicit statutory language, the presumption against remedial
preemption is overcome only when it is clear that state remedies
would interfere with the primary purposes of the federal law. Finally,
we believe that the relevant federal purposes in the context of
preemption analysis are the purposes that, as understood in collective
action terms, justify regulation at the federal, rather than state level.
1. The Presumption Against Preemption
The Supreme Court has often stated that there is a presumption
against preemption, although it has also indicated that the
presumption may not apply in some areas of dominant federal
concern, and it has not consistently accorded the presumption the
same weight.16 Whatever the general scope and force of the
15 Indeed, this sort of floor preemption would seem to follow even without displacement
of state authority, because the assertion of compliance with a lower state standard as a defense
would directly conflict with the operation of federal law and thus be trumped by it.
Displacement of state authority to establish lower standards would not be necessary, however, to
achieve minimum levels of protection, since the parallel enforcement of state remedies, even
those imposing less protective standards, would not interfere with the federal minimum unless it
prevented a later prosecution. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 583 n.19. In effect, the
party who violated both the federal standard and the state’s less protective standard would be
subject to a greater chance of prosecution and higher penalties as a result of violating both
standards.
16 The majority and dissent disagreed about the application of the presumption against
preemption in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). See infra notes 90–92 and
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presumption, it should have special weight as applied to remedial
preemption of state judicial remedies because the federalism and
institutional concerns that justify the presumption are particularly
powerful in this context.
The primary justification for the presumption against preemption
is respect for the sovereign authority of states. This respect is
especially justified in the area of tort remedies, which have
traditionally been a matter of state law. Indeed, many state
constitutions, including the constitution of our home state, Kansas,
specifically recognize the right of injured citizens to a “remedy by
due course of law.”17 Given the importance attached by the states to
providing such remedies, Congress should be especially cautious
about displacing state authority to provide them, and courts should be
especially cautious about inferring the intent to do so in the absence
of explicit statutory language.
The presumption against preemption of state judicial remedies can
be understood both as a principle of legislative draftsmanship and as a
quasi-constitutional clear statement principle. As a principle of
legislative draftsmanship, the presumption reasons that insofar as
Congress may expressly provide for preemption of state remedies, the
failure to do so raises an inference that remedial preemption was not
intended.18 As a quasi-constitutional clear statement principle, the
presumption against preemption implements federalism principles by
prompting courts to read ambiguous statutes to avoid unnecessary
intrusions on state authority to provide common law remedies.19

accompanying text.
17 KAN. CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS, § 18 (“All persons, for injuries suffered in person,
reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without
delay.”).
18 This rationale also applies to express preemption provisions applicable to state law
“standards,” “requirements,” “prohibitions,” or similar terms. Congress’s failure to use language
that addresses remedies is significant, since the primary function of state judicial remedies is to
provide compensation for injured individuals, rather than to establish regulatory standards,
requirements, or prohibitions—even if the award of compensation has incidental regulatory
effects. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES
TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 232 (2008) (“The primary function of the common law is to dispense
corrective justice by forcing those who have unlawfully damaged others to compensate their
victims.”); id. at 252 (“[C]orrective justice is the primary function of the common law of
torts . . . .”). Courts should not interpret such express preemption provisions to cover state
judicial remedies absent a showing that those remedies interfere with the purposes of the federal
legislation, and the burden of proving such interference (through empirical evidence, for
example) should be on the party arguing in favor of preemption. For further discussion of the
purposes and effects of state judicial remedies, see infra Part II.B.
19 This approach recognizes the constitutional role of states as a counterweight to the
assertion of federal power, while acknowledging the supremacy of federal law. It assumes that
Congress respects that role and does not lightly infer congressional intent to displace state
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Taken together, these principles also suggest a political process
rationale for the presumption—by requiring Congress to address the
preemptive effect of statutes explicitly, the presumption reinforces the
political safeguards of federalism.20
A comparison to the problem of implied private rights of action is
particularly instructive. In Cort v. Ash,21 the Supreme Court curtailed
the recognition of implied federal causes of action, stressing a
negative inference from Congress’s failure to provide an express
cause of action. In the wake of Cort, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to establish an implied right of action under federal statutes.22 The

authority, particularly in areas of constitutional importance to states.
20 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1328–29 (2001) (discussing how federal lawmaking procedures safeguard
federalism). Unlike federal agencies or federal courts, senators and representatives in Congress
are politically accountable to geographic constituencies. Even if these political safeguards
operate imperfectly, they are the constitutionally designed mechanism for protecting state
interests in the legislative process. Note that this analysis suggests critical differences between
preemption as a result of federal statutes and preemption as a result of administrative
regulations, insofar as agencies are not subject to the political safeguards of federalism. The
Supreme Court has held that an agency’s authority to promulgate regulatory standards did not
include the authority to decide the preemptive scope of the statute because the statute did not
clearly delegate the latter authority. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–50
(1990); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 263 (2006) (rejecting an interpretive rule
adopted by the attorney general because “[t]he statutory terms . . . do not call on the Attorney
General, or any other executive official, to make an independent assessment of the meaning of
federal law”). Likewise, in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the Court declined to defer
to the FDA’s conclusions regarding the preemptive effect of federal drug labeling requirements.
See infra note 96. This is an important and fascinating issue whose implications we will not
explore in this Article. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007); Karen Jordan, Opening the Door to Hard-Look Review of Agency
Preemption, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 353 (2009).
21 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
22 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1083 (1997) (“The creation of wholly new implied rights of action has
largely passed from the scene.”); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1097, 1127 n.113 (2006) (“The Cort and Cannon decisions are, in retrospect, largely
doctrinal rest stops on the path from a rule conceptualizing the adoption of appropriate remedies
as a proper equitable function for the courts to one in which the courts are powerless to
extrapolate remedies beyond those that Congress expressly established or clearly intended but
simply forgot to memorialize.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93,
102–05 (2005) (describing how “[t]he standards used by courts to determine whether to imply a
private right of action have changed substantially in the last thirty years”); see also H. Miles
Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State
and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 521–22 (1986) (asserting that various arguments
for how to infer congressional intent in the face of textual silence “are not about actual
legislative intentions; they are designed for cases in which there is no hard evidence of
legislative intentions. These legal arguments masquerade as arguments about legislative facts.
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Court has not always applied the presumption against implied
preemption with equal vigor, however. As a result, the failure to
include an express preemption clause in the statute does not
necessarily preclude a finding of implied preemption. The
juxtaposition of these two tendencies has particular significance if a
federal regulatory statute is silent with respect to both remedial
preemption and a federal cause of action. Because the Court appears
to be more willing to infer remedial preemption than to infer an
implied right of action, the result could well be the preemption of
state remedies without the provision of any substitute federal
remedy—even though Congress was silent on both issues.23
2. The Purposes of Federal Law
In general terms, the extent to which state authority is displaced by
federal law depends on the purposes of the federal law. This is true
whether courts are interpreting the scope of an ambiguous express
preemption provision, determining the existence or scope of federal
occupation of the field, or assessing the displacement of state
authority to prevent the exercise of that authority from impeding the
accomplishment of the object and purpose of federal law.24 Given the
concerns articulated above, the presumption against remedial
preemption should not be lightly overcome and requires careful
attention to the extent to which state remedial authority would
interfere with the attainment of the purposes of federal law.
Of particular relevance here is the extent to which most federal
laws have multiple purposes of varying degrees of centrality. We
believe it is important to distinguish between the primary or principal
purposes of a statute—those justifications that were central to a
statute’s adoption—and secondary purposes that might have been
articulated during the legislative process. In the absence of an express
remedial preemption provision, courts should be especially reluctant

At bottom, they are legal arguments about the adjudicatory consequences that should be
assigned to legislative silence by operation of law.”).
23 Cf. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (denying the availability of a right
of action under ERISA against non-fiduciaries, even though express preemption provision
barred state remedies, thus leaving the intended statutory beneficiaries of ERISA without any
remedy). Justice Thomas’s position in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), however,
appears to treat implied preemption, in the sense of displacement of state authority, similarly to
implied rights of action. See supra note 10.
24 See generally Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 585–89 (discussing the relevance
of purposes to various types of preemption). In contrast, when there is a direct conflict it
is unnecessary to determine federal statutory purposes because the conflict itself requires
preemption under the Supremacy Clause.
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to infer remedial preemption based solely on secondary statutory
purposes. For example, when the principal purposes of federal law
relate to ensuring minimum health and safety standards (establishing
a floor), a court should be reluctant to infer displacement of state
remedial authority based on a secondary purpose of promoting
uniformity or balancing economic and health or safety considerations.
Of course, the characterization of such purposes as primary or
secondary may be disputed and unclear, especially because statutory
provisions that reflect the “secondary” purposes may have been
essential to the adoption of the statute. We draw this distinction not
because there is any magic to the characterization of primary and
secondary purposes, but rather to underscore the basic point that the
sovereign interests of the states are entitled to respect, and one way in
which that respect is manifested is in the consistent application of a
strong presumption against preemption. Accordingly, the courts
should require the party arguing that the federal statute in question
has preemptive effect to provide a strong showing that the availability
of state judicial remedies would frustrate statutory purposes (whether
they are labeled “primary” or “secondary”) to such an extent that
Congress would not have wanted to allow those remedies to remain
available.
Assuming a strong presumption against remedial preemption that
is only overcome by strong evidence that state remedies would
interfere with the primary objectives or purposes of federal law, the
question becomes what kinds of primary objectives and purposes state
remedies would likely obstruct. That is where the collective action
perspective comes in.
3. Collective Action and Federal Regulation
The collective action perspective on federal preemption begins
with the recognition that federalism is a structural response to
collective action problems among states. Collective action problems
arise when individual states have incentives to act in a manner that is
contrary to the interests of states as a collective, and transaction and
enforcement costs would prevent an effective agreement among the
states to act collectively. Typical examples include negative
externalities, resource pooling, the race to the bottom, uniformity and
rationalization of standards, and the “NIMBY” phenomenon. In the
broadest sense, the benefits of collective action in these situations
produce a public or collective good for all the states.25
25 In essence, when collective action produces collective benefits, those benefits are a
species of public good; thus, individual states have incentives to act as free riders and a
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The exercise of federal authority is most justified in response to
collective action problems that provide incentives for states to act in a
manner that is inconsistent with the interest of the nation as a whole.
Most federal regulatory legislation responds to one or more collective
action problems, as reflected in the statutory purposes. In other words,
federal action is necessary or justified when state regulation is
unlikely to produce the optimal result, viewed from the perspective of
the United States as a whole, because the incentives of individual
states and the interests of the states as a collective run in different
directions.
Our approach to preemption issues takes this principle one step
further, arguing that displacement of state authority is most justified
when individual states’ regulations are the product of the very
incentives to act in a manner contrary to the collective interest that
justified federal action. Of particular significance for remedial
preemption as a species of ceiling preemption is that displacement of
state authority is justified primarily when collective action principles
would suggest that state courts have incentives to “overregulate” in
ways that interfere with the interests of the nation as a whole.
C. Federal Purposes, State Incentives, and Ceiling Preemption
Not all of the collective action problems identified above create
incentives to overregulate. In this section, we consider which of these
problems are likely to lead to overregulation by states in a manner
that might justify ceiling preemption. The focus here is on ceiling
preemption generally, and not the more specific question of remedial
preemption. We address the distinctive issues raised by remedial
preemption in Part II of the Article.
1. Resource Pooling and the Race to the Bottom
We will address resource pooling and the race-to-the-bottom
rationales for federal regulation first, because these two rationales do
not generally support ceiling preemption. To the extent that these
purposes do not support ceiling preemption, it follows without further
inquiry that they would not generally support remedial preemption.
Resource pooling rests on the idea that collective action by states
creates economies of scale or other synergies. Common examples
might include collective bargaining, national defense, or scientific

“prisoners’ dilemma” results. For discussion of that dilemma, see Glicksman & Levy, supra
note 3, at 597–98.
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research. Federal action is justified because the states individually
lack the resources or incentives to act effectively in these areas. To
the extent that federal health and safety regulation rests on resource
pooling rationales, the concern that necessitates federal action is that
states will underregulate. Ceiling preemption would not be justified
because regulation that goes beyond federal action does not derive
from or create the problem that resource pooling is designed to
address—insufficient state regulation.26
Similarly, federal regulation in response to a so-called race to the
bottom also would not generally support ceiling preemption. The
concern reflected in a race-to-the-bottom scenario is that states would
underregulate because of competition with other states for business.27
There is considerable academic debate over whether a race to the
bottom should be viewed as a problem, rather than a form of
beneficial interjurisdictional competition, and the extent to which it
actually occurs and presents an obstacle to proper state regulation.28
Regardless of the merits of this debate, to the extent that the race to
the bottom presents incentives for states to underregulate, federal
26 One possible exception to this point might be in the area of international negotiations,
in which unilateral state action might undermine the bargaining position of the United States.
See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that Massachusetts
law designed to pressure Burma/Myanmar to improve human rights practices was preempted by
federal law delegating authority in this area to the President). The auto industry raised this
argument, for example, as an objection to state regulations designed to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions that contribute to climate change, on the theory that it would weaken the ability of the
United States to negotiate concessions on greenhouse gas emission reductions from other
countries. See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D.
Cal. 2007) (rejecting argument and granting summary judgment to the state); Green Mountain
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 392 (D. Vt. 2007) (rejecting
argument). See generally Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 618–24 (discussing issue). This
potential argument in favor of ceiling preemption is generally not at issue in the context of
remedial preemption and will not be discussed further in this Article.
27 See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937) (reasoning that federal old age
insurance was justified because “states and local governments are at times reluctant to increase
so heavily the burden of taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of placing themselves in
a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors”); Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (reasoning that federal unemployment
compensation was necessary because “[m]any [states] held back through alarm lest, in laying
such a toll upon their industries, they would place themselves in a position of economic
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors”).
28 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race”
and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); Richard
L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341
(1996); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992);
Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check
in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting,
8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998).
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regulation to combat a race to the bottom would not support ceiling
preemption to invalidate state regulation that is more protective than
federal regulation.29
2. Uniformity and Rationalization of Standards
A common justification for federal regulation is the need for
uniformity, particularly as a means of removing obstructions to
interstate commerce. In economic terms we might conceive of this
federal purpose as the rationalization of regulatory standards so as to
reduce transaction costs associated with a national market. The
benefits of reducing transaction costs and establishing a national
market may be understood as public goods that individual states may
tend to undervalue because many of the benefits are experienced
outside the state. Especially when powerful interests within a state
benefit from a standard that deviates from that of other states or when
the transition to new standards imposes significant costs, state policy
makers may lack incentives to achieve uniformity.30 Even in the
absence of such difficulties, the achievement by states of uniform
standards requires that they overcome the transaction costs of
reaching agreement on those standards.31
Because state regulation that exceeds national standards is
incompatible with uniformity and states’ incentives may run counter
to the national interest in achieving it, a federal purpose of achieving
uniformity would tend to support ceiling preemption. Nonetheless, it
is important to emphasize that not all legislative expressions of a
desire for uniformity reflect a significant purpose of rationalizing
standards so as to minimize transaction costs. For example,
proponents of federal legislation to combat a race-to-the-bottom
problem might extol the value of a uniform federal standard, but the
focus in such a case may well be the establishment of a uniform floor

29 One might conceive of the converse problem (a “race to the top”), in which states
compete to attract desirable residents and businesses through overregulation. This problem is
better conceived of as a manifestation of the NIMBY problem, discussed below. See infra notes
37–38 and accompanying text.
30 In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), for example, the Court
invalidated a state law requiring use of contoured mud flaps on trucks as an obstruction of
interstate commerce because other states required straight mud flaps. It was reported to one of
the authors by a student that the manufacturer of contoured mud flaps was located in the state.
Although we were unable to verify this claim, the scenario is plausible and serves to illustrate
the point that state policy makers may have incentives to benefit local interests at the expense of
the national interest in reducing the transaction costs of interstate commerce.
31 In many instances, however, all states may benefit, and there are examples of states
voluntarily achieving rationalization of legal standards, most prominently in the case of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
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to provide a minimum level of protection.32 In such a case, uniformity
would not support ceiling preemption because the focus is not on
reducing transaction costs by rationalizing standards.33
In addition, the strength of these concerns may differ sharply based
on the differences between regulation of goods and services that are
mobile and regulation of fixed sources.34 Consumer products, for
example, move frequently across state lines, especially if those
products are used for purposes of transportation. This movement
makes rationalization of standards relatively more important with
respect to such goods and services than with respect to goods or
services that are stationary and fixed, such as a large power plant.
This is not to say that the need for uniformity would never justify
ceiling preemption for stationary or fixed goods and services, but
rather that the case for ceiling preemption is not as intrinsically
powerful.
More broadly, uniformity is to some extent inherent in federal
regulation, and achieving uniformity is likely to appear at least as a
secondary consideration or justification for virtually any federal
regulatory law. To avoid the intrusion on state autonomy that would
result from preemption of a broad swath of state regulation, the
purpose of promoting uniformity to rationalize standards and thereby
reduce transaction costs for regulated entities should be a clear,
primary purpose of the federal law before it justifies preemption of
state law.

32 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2006) (enunciating goal in the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act to “establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations”); Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs,
Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 327 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing the goal of that statute as being “to
establish a ‘nationwide’ program of minimum standards for protecting health, safety, and the
environment”); Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 59 (2d Cir. 1988)
(rejecting argument that the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678,
preempted local regulations requiring training and certification of asbestos removal worker
because “[t]he statute’s purpose was to assure minimum—but not necessarily uniform—
occupational health and safety standards”). As Tom McGarity has explained, regulatory
standards are usually designed to provide minimum, across-the-board standards applicable to all
regulated entities, rather than representing the expert agency’s judgment that its standard
represents the optimal protective action that should apply in all situations. MCGARITY, supra
note 18, at 260–61.
33 Cf. MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 266 (arguing that federal health and safety standards
based on what is feasible or what is necessary to provide a certain minimum level of protection
do not conflict with remedies for state common law causes of action that require defendants “to
rise above the minimum when a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would do so”).
34 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 627–36 (discussing distinction between
pollution from mobile and stationary pollution sources in terms of the need for uniformity).
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3. Externalities
One important justification for regulation at the federal level is that
activity within one state produces externalities that affect other states.
This sort of externality may be negative, in the sense that the state
exports burdens to other states (through unregulated activity or
through regulation itself), or positive, in the sense that the state
exports benefits (in the form of reduced negative externalities as a
result of the state’s self-regulation or in the form of economic benefits
resulting from the failure to regulate activities that produce harms
within the state). The externalization of burdens or benefits means
that an individual state’s incentives will not align with the interest of
the states as a whole.
If there is a negative externality and the burdens of an activity are
exported, then we might expect the state of origin to tolerate or
promote too much of that activity (viewed from the vantage point of
the collective). If the concern is private activity that causes harm in
other states, such as pollution or the production of dangerous
products, then the state in which the activity occurs has an incentive
to underregulate. When dealing with products sold nationwide, for
example, states in which the products are produced may have
incentives to underregulate because the undesirable health and safety
impacts of those products are borne primarily by those in other states,
while the economic benefits of the activity are concentrated
internally. This sort of concern would justify federal regulation to
establish minimum standards (i.e., floor preemption), but would not
ordinarily justify preemption of higher state standards.
In some circumstances, however, the negative externality may be a
regulatory burden.35 When the regulatory burden of state law is
exported to other states or to actors in other states, then the state
exporting the burden has an incentive to overregulate. States in which
products are sold, but not manufactured, may have incentives to
require such products to meet stringent health and safety standards,
insofar as the regulatory burdens will be felt primarily in other,
manufacturing states. Thus, federal action might be justified to
prevent overregulation, and this action might support ceiling

35 This issue frequently arises under the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, in which
the Court has expressed concerns about the export of regulatory burdens. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945) (“[T]he Court has often recognized that to the extent that
the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by
the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are
affected.”).
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preemption of state laws that impose higher health and safety
standards than those reflected in federal law.36
If the activity in question produces benefits that are exported to
other states, then we might expect too little of the activity. In some
respects, this is simply the flip side of a negative externality. For
example, regulation of pollution-causing activities in a state that
exports environmental harms produces a positive externality in other
states. Thus, the state’s incentives might lead to underregulation.
Federal regulation to combat underregulation resulting from positive
externalities would not generally support ceiling preemption.
If, however, an activity within a state produces economic benefits
that are exported to other states, but causes health and safety burdens
within the state, then the state may have an incentive to overregulate.
This is, in essence, the NIMBY problem. Consider, for example, the
problem of waste disposal and the export of waste disposal services.37
The environmental, health, and safety costs of waste disposal are
concentrated locally, while the benefits of having facilities to dispose
of waste, especially radioactive and hazardous waste, are felt
nationally. For this reason, a state may have incentives to
overregulate so as to block the siting of a facility in the state.38
This discussion suggests two basic conclusions about the
implications of federal regulation to address externalities. First,
ceiling preemption is not ordinarily justified if the purpose of federal
regulation is to prevent the export of health and safety risks to other
states, because that kind of externality would tend to cause
underregulation. Second, ceiling preemption may be justified in one
of two circumstances: (1) when states have incentives to export
regulatory burdens, or (2) when states have incentives to overregulate
an activity that exports benefits to other states.

36 As we discuss more fully below, state remedies may be different from state regulation
in several respects that may be relevant to the preemption analysis. See infra Part II.
37 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that ban on
import of wastes violated the dormant Commerce Clause). Although the Court in City of
Philadelphia treated the law in question as a ban on imports, a more accurate characterization
would be that the law banned the export of waste disposal space. Viewed from that perspective,
it is clear that the law was the product of a NIMBY problem because the benefits of waste
disposal within New Jersey were felt in other states, but the burden of adverse environmental
consequences (i.e., increased risks of leakage and contamination or a decline in the amount of
available open space) was felt in New Jersey.
38 This appears to be the rationale behind the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021d (2000). The 1980 Act was amended in 1986. Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986).
See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–51 (1992) (discussing the
operation of low-level radioactive waste facilities and legislation pertaining to them).
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4. General Framework
The analysis to this point suggests a general framework for
analyzing the kinds of federal regulatory purposes that might support
ceiling preemption of state health and safety regulations. These
purposes are relevant to all three kinds of preemption under standard
preemption doctrine. They are relevant to the congressional decision
whether to expressly preempt (or save) state authority to regulate and
in interpreting the scope of any express preemption provision (or
savings clause). They are relevant to the determination of whether
federal law has occupied the field, which is determined under current
doctrine by assessing whether the purpose of the federal law requires
occupation of the field and whether there is a dominant federal
interest. They are also relevant to the scope of an occupied field.
Finally, they are relevant in determining whether conflict preemption
has occurred, which depends on whether enforcement of the state law
would obstruct the object and purpose of the federal law.
Our approach focuses on the collective action problems among
states that justify regulation at the federal level to analyze whether the
purposes of federal regulation support preemption of state judicial
remedies. From this perspective, it appears that resource pooling and
combating a race to the bottom do not generally support ceiling
preemption, while the rationalization of regulatory standards
(uniformity), overcoming the externalization of regulatory burdens,
and responding to a NIMBY problem might.
We say “might” because the presence of one or more of these
purposes is not sufficient, in and of itself, to support preemption. The
states are sovereign entities with the authority and responsibility to
exercise the police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
their citizens. In light of the constitutional weight afforded this
authority,39 the presumption against preemption requires that ceiling
preemption be explicit, or that statutory purposes that justify implied
ceiling preemption be sufficiently clear and important to warrant the
displacement of state authority. The analysis of these questions will
necessarily depend on the specifics of the federal statute involved.
Even if ceiling preemption of state regulation is justified,
moreover, it does not inevitably follow that state judicial remedies
39 This weight is perhaps reflected in the practice of the Supreme Court of referring to
“Our Federalism” using capital letters, beginning in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
Although the Court had used the term at least as far back as 1939, see Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S.
398, 428 (1939), it apparently did not merit capitalization until Younger. Recent decisions use
both the upper case and lower case versions of the term. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 748 (1999) (lower case); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587 (1999)
(upper case).
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should be preempted. In the next part of the Article, we consider the
differences between state remedies and other forms of state law and
what those differences imply for application of ceiling preemption to
state judicial remedies.
II. CEILING PREEMPTION AND STATE REMEDIES
Assuming that a sufficiently clear and important federal purpose
supports ceiling preemption, the question remains whether the
displaced state regulatory authority encompasses state judicial
remedies. We believe that there are important differences between
state judicial remedies and other forms of state regulation that warrant
special consideration when analyzing remedial preemption issues.
These include the differences between legislatures and courts as
policymaking bodies, the differences between legislative rules40 and
judicial remedies as instruments of policy, and the possibility of
accommodating federal regulation within the remedial structure of
state law. All of these differences generally support affording federal
law less preemptive effect on judicial remedies than on legislative
rules.
A. Courts vs. Legislatures
The prior discussion of the incentives of states did not consider the
nature of the institutional processes through which those incentives
affect the expression of policy preferences as law.41 Yet the process
through which positive state regulation is adopted differs in important
respects from the process through which courts provide remedies, and
these differences affect the extent to which we might expect the law
to reflect the narrow self-interests of the state. In particular, the
enactment of laws by a politically accountable legislature (and
implementation by politically accountable agencies) is substantially
more likely to be affected by problematic incentives than are judicial
decisions regarding remedies.

40 We use this term to include both statutes enacted by state legislatures and binding
regulations issued by state agencies.
41 Incentives issues are particularly salient for burden export and NIMBY problems,
which are essentially problems of state incentives. The ways in which state incentives may
undervalue rationalization of standards so that transaction costs are reduced are less obvious. In
any event, inquiry into those incentives may be less important when there is a primary federal
purpose of rationalizing standards, insofar as any state standards that deviate from the federal
norm interfere with the purpose of achieving uniformity, even if they are the product of
historical accident or other factors.
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1. Political Accountability and Legislative Incentives
Notwithstanding public choice and related criticisms of the
political process, the essential feature of legislatures is their political
accountability. The law assumes, because of this accountability, that
legislators will enact laws that reflect the interests of the state; i.e.,
enact laws that are pleasing to (and oppose laws that are not pleasing
to) their political constituencies.42 Thus, the political process tends to
align legislation with the interests of constituents, which for state
legislators means interests within the state. While state administrative
agencies are less directly politically accountable, some state
administrators may be elected and most others are appointed and
removed by the governor, also a political actor.
Consider, for example, the problem of exporting a regulatory
burden. This phenomenon is problematic because the out-of-state
parties that bear the burden lack political input and are not part of the
constituency to whom the legislators answer.43 The citizens of the
state, on the other hand, gain the benefits of improved health and
safety or environmental quality that result. From the perspective of a
legislator, such regulations would be desirable because there is a
chance to gain political favor with in-state constituencies without any
loss of political support from other in-state constituencies. The
assumption that state legislatures are likely to favor in-state interests
is widespread and lies at the foundations of various constitutional
provisions and doctrines or statutory schemes.44
2. Judicial Independence and Incentives
In contrast to legislators, courts, as an institution, are generally
more insulated from and independent of the political process. While
the independence of federal judges is protected by the appointment
process, life tenure, and salary protections,45 state judges typically
42 There is disagreement, of course, about the elements of their constituency to which
legislators respond—average voters, members of their party, major contributors, or some other
subset.
43 Under some views of the legislative process, however, legislators might respond to outof-state interests that make substantial political contributions.
44 See supra note 35 (citing example of this reasoning under the dormant Commerce
Clause).
45 Even with these protections, empirical evidence suggests that political affiliations of
federal judges affect their decisionmaking. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
823 (2006); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV.
301 (2004); cf. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623
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have fewer safeguards of independence. For example, many state
judges face potentially contested elections (either partisan or
nonpartisan), and a majority stand periodically for retention.46
Notwithstanding relatively greater political accountability of state
judges as compared to federal judges, a variety of factors suggest that
political considerations are much less significant for judicial decisions
than for legislative votes.47
For those judges that do stand for election, the role of political
pressure on policy issues tends to be more muted than in legislative
elections. Retention elections, for example, are uncontested, and
judges seldom are expelled on the basis of their decisions, although it
does happen from time to time for particularly high-profile and
unpopular decisions.48 Contested elections are often nonpartisan, and
even partisan elections are less likely to be hotly contested than their
legislative counterparts or to attract active public interest, even if
there is a trend toward increasing politicization of judicial elections.49

(2009) (discussing impact of judicial elections in locations dominated by one political party on
judicial decisions).
46 For a
comprehensive compilation of state judicial selection methods, see
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2007), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/
docs/Judicial%20Selection%20Charts.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL SELECTION]; see also Stephen
J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 386, 387–94
(2008) (providing an overview of state methods for selecting state supreme court justices with a
focus on the role of the bar). According to JUDICIAL SELECTION, nine states select trial judges of
general jurisdiction by partisan election, six select intermediate appellate judges by partisan
election, and eight select judges of the court of last resort by partisan election. JUDICIAL
SELECTION, supra, at 4–6. A much larger number use merit selection: seventeen states use merit
selection for trial courts, eighteen for courts of appeal, and twenty-five (half) for the court of last
resort. Id. Even in states with merit selection, nonpartisan retention elections are common. Id.
47 Our colleague Steve Ware has argued, however, that current judicial selection methods
in some states make them overly accountable to the bar as a special interest. See Ware, supra
note 46, at 394–409 (advocating changes to the selection process in Kansas to reduce the
influence of the bar). The implications of this argument for preemption analysis are unclear,
because the influence of the bar may tend to favor either plaintiffs or defendants, although it
might be argued that both the plaintiff and defendant bars have incentives to increase the
amount of litigation, which would tend to favor more judicial remedies.
48 See, e.g., Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State
and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 248 (1999) (referring to “the rare but high profile incidents of
judges being rejected by an electorate”); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and
Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2007 (1988) (discussing the 1986 California election in which Chief Justice Rose Byrd of
the California Supreme Court was ousted in a retention election).
49 See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters
for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1263–69 (2008) (discussing various
developments that contribute to increased politicization of judicial elections).
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While critics may argue with some force that judicial elections
compromise judicial independence,50 other factors tend to diminish
the extent to which even elected judges are likely to decide cases in
accordance with the perceived interests of their constituents. The
nature of the judicial office limits the extent to which judges
campaign on the basis of their decisions. While Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White51 held that the First Amendment protects judges’
ability to conduct election campaigns, the extent to which judges can
and do campaign on the basis of how they would decide cases
remains limited by both tradition and ethical canons.52 Conversely,
research suggests that the public is less attentive to judicial
elections.53 If so, then judges would tend to be less concerned that
they will be punished politically for their decisions—except that the
public may of course react to controversial, high-profile decisions.
More fundamentally, judges remain accountable to the law in other
ways, particularly through precedent and the potential for appeal.
While a legislator is free to vote in accordance with his or her views
of public policy or the interests of constituents, judges are not. By
training and inclination, they use the legal method, which places
emphasis on precedent, even if there are means of avoiding or
overruling it. For lower courts, the possibility of being reversed on
appeal is a significant check on the judge’s ability to decide a case in
accordance with his or her views of the preferences of constituents,
and even state supreme court justices may have to be concerned about
the possibility of reversal by the United States Supreme Court.54 It is
also worth noting that, to the extent litigation of state remedies
satisfies the requirements of diversity of citizenship, the case can be
removed to federal court.55
50 For an extreme example, see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009) (holding that due process requires recusal of elected judge from case involving litigant
who spent millions of dollars in support of his election).
51 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
52 For example, canons prohibiting judges from committing to decide a case in a particular
way have been upheld. E.g., Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351 (E.D. Pa.
2007); Fla. Family Policy Council v. Freeman, No. 4:06cv00395 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2007)
(order of dismissal).
53 See Geyh, supra note 49, at 1270–72 (discussing data suggesting substantial “roll off”
from voters who vote in executive and legislative races but not judicial elections and whether
increasingly hotly contested elections will change that tendency).
54 Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L.
REV. 469 (1998) (concluding that the possibility of being reversed on appeal affects the
incentives of trial judges).
55 Of course, under the Erie doctrine the federal court would apply the forum state’s law,
which means that diversity jurisdiction responds only to the potential that forum state interests
would affect the particular case, and not the potential problem that the forum state’s law itself
reflects improper state incentives.
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All this is not to say that state judges are immune from
consideration of their state’s interests when deciding cases.56 Indeed,
as Justice Story famously proclaimed, “[t]he constitution has
presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state
attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests,
might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or
control, the regular administration of justice.”57 Diversity jurisdiction,
after all, is based on the fear that state courts and juries will treat
out-of-state parties unfairly.58 The difference in the nature of political
accountability of legislatures and judges nevertheless suggests that
courts should not assume that congressional concern about improper
state regulatory incentives necessarily extends to judicial decisions.
The same difference also suggests that the evidence to justify
remedial preemption should reflect specific concern for judicial
incentives, not merely general concern for state incentives.59
These issues are illustrated by International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette,60 which held that, while the federal Clean Water Act
preempted a claim under the nuisance law of the state in which the
pollution damage occurred, it did not preempt a suit based on the
common law of the source state.61 In terms of our framework, the
displacement of the downstream state’s nuisance remedies would
only make sense if the Clean Water Act reflected significant federal
56

For example, Richard E. Neely, a former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice, wrote:

As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured
in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I
give someone else’s money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state
plaintiffs, their families, and their friends will reelect me.
RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE
POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988). Neely advocates an expanded role for federal common
law as a solution to the problem of unreasonable products liability judgments. See id. at 28–29.
57 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816).
58 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication,
94 VA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2008) (“[T]he constitutional inclusion and the continued
congressional authorization of federal diversity jurisdiction suggest . . . that state courts’
susceptibility to bias against out-of-state parties renders them less able than federal courts to
resolve state law questions ‘correctly.’”).
59 This analysis would not apply to remedies created by state statute, however, because
statutory remedies are enacted by politically accountable legislators rather than adopted by
judicial decision.
60 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
61 The Court in Ouellette reasoned that “the application of Vermont law against
[International Paper] would allow [the plaintiffs] to circumvent the [Act’s] permit system,
thereby upsetting the balance of public and private interests so carefully addressed by the Act.”
Id. at 494. It also found that allowing tort actions to be brought under the common law of the
affected state would allow “Vermont and other States [to] do indirectly what they could not do
directly—regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources.” Id. at 495. Finally, the Court determined
that “[a]pplication of an affected State’s law to an out-of-state source also would undermine the
important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system.” Id. at 496.
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concerns that judges in downstream states would have incentives to
export regulatory burdens to upstream states.62 At the same time,
however, the Court rejected the defendant paper company’s argument
that any parties injured by water pollution should be required to sue in
the courts of the source state, as well as rely on source state common
law.63 Thus, the paper company apparently believed that the courts of
its home state would treat it more favorably both in terms of the
applicable nuisance law (which the Supreme Court accepted) and in
terms of the application of that law (which the Supreme Court
rejected).
B. Legislative Rules vs. Judicial Decisions
Another important difference between ordinary ceiling preemption
and remedial preemption is the difference between the purpose and
effect of legislative rules and of judicial remedies. The purposes of
legislative rules and judicial remedies differ in that most legislative
rules focus primarily on controlling the conduct of the regulated
entity, while judicial remedies also are designed to compensate or
otherwise provide relief for a party who has suffered harm.64 In terms
62 Insofar as the Court interpreted the statute as permitting only source states to impose
stricter regulation of discharges into their waters, see id. at 499 (“Because the Act specifically
allows source States to impose stricter standards, the imposition of source-state law does not
disrupt the regulatory partnership established by the permit system.”), the statute would appear
to reflect concern about the export of regulatory burdens by downstream states. While this
interpretation of the Clean Water Act is debatable, see Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman,
Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42
VAND. L. REV. 343, 403 (1989), if accurate it would justify ceiling preemption of regulation by
downstream states. It does not follow from this conclusion, however, that downstream state
nuisance remedies should also be preempted, unless the statute also reflected equal concern that
judges would have similar incentives to export burdens to upstream states. Insofar as the statute
contains an express savings clause for judicial remedies that is broadly worded and does not
distinguish between upstream and downstream states, see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006), the case
for preempting state judicial remedies is weaker.
63 The Court concluded that “application of the source State’s law does not disturb the
balance among federal, source-state, and affected-state interests,” Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498–99,
and added that “the restriction of suits to those brought under source-state nuisance law prevents
a source from being subject to an indeterminate number of potential regulations.” Id. at 499.
64 Alexandra Klass distinguishes between those tort laws intended to serve as a branch of
public regulatory law by deterring undesirable conduct, compensating victims of wrongdoing,
and spreading undesirable losses, and those tort laws designed to provide citizens with the right
to redress private wrongs, thereby setting standards for individual rights and responsibilities and
assuring citizens that the government will provide them with a judicial means of redress based
on individual circumstances. She contends that the public law component of tort law should be
protected from federal interference under federalism principles, including the presumption
against preemption. The private law aspects of tort law should be protected not only by
federalism principles, but also by principles of due process. Alexandra B. Klass, Tort
Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2009). For
discussion of potential takings issues arising from preemption of state judicial remedies, see
infra note 72 and accompanying text. Cf. MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 31–34 (describing the
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of effects, legislative rules have a more direct and significant impact
on a class of regulated entities than do judicial decisions, which
directly bind only the parties and may be distinguished in later
decisions.
Both the purposes and effects of state law are relevant to analysis
of the preemptive effect of federal law, but they are relevant to
different aspects of that analysis. The purposes of state law are
relevant because they reflect the weight of the state’s interest in the
preservation of its laws. As we indicate below, states have a strong
interest in the preservation of state judicial remedies that provide
compensation for those injured by the activities of others, particularly
if the federal regulatory program creates no substitute for the
preempted state compensatory remedies. In this “corrective justice”
context, the strength of the state’s interest would support the
application of a very strong presumption against preemption.65 The
effects of state laws are relevant to whether those laws conflict with
the purposes of federal law in such a way as to warrant preemption. A
legitimate set of state purposes should not save from preemption a
law that impermissibly interferes with the accomplishment of federal
goals. Conversely, a state law prompted by concerns that Congress
would not have regarded as legitimate should not support preemption
if the operation of that law does not impair federal goals.
1. The Purposes of Judicial Remedies
As noted above, while the primary purpose of legislative rules is
typically to affect the conduct of regulated parties, judicial remedies,
particularly tort remedies, have an important compensatory
function.66 It may be true, as proponents of law and economics argue,
shift in emphasis over time between the corrective justice and protective justice functions of tort
law).
65 See MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 31 (defining corrective justice as “the correction of
unjust changes in wealth that result from interactions among the members of a polity” and
describing its function as “‘redress[ing] unjust gains and losses by means of a financial
adjustment’” (quoting Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic
Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2355 (1990))); WILLIAM FUNK ET
AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: REGULATORY PREEMPTION
AT THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 10 (2008), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/NHTSA_Preemption_804.pdf (“When people are
injured despite manufacturer compliance with existing safety standards, the corrective justice
function of state tort law ensures that those injured are properly compensated in light of the
evolving state of technology and new information available to the manufacturer.”). See
generally Wells, supra (comparing distributive and corrective justice and exploring the
justifications for the corrective justice function of tort law).
66 Of course, state statutes may create remedies as well. Thus, these arguments would also
apply to the preemption of statutory remedies.
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that common law tort rules have a deterrent effect and are consistent
with a policy designed to promote efficient behavior,67 but that should
not cause courts to lose sight of the fact that the primary goal of tort
law is compensation.68 State constitutions do not enshrine the right to
a “remedy by due course of law” because of a desire to efficiently
regulate conduct,69 but rather because widespread conceptions of
justice require compensation when a person suffers injury from the
wrongful conduct of another.
Unlike the preemption of state legislative rules, the preemption of
state judicial remedies displaces not only their regulatory (or police
power) component, but also their compensatory role. This point is
particularly significant when the federal law in question does not
provide a remedy.70 When such a federal law displaces a state
legislative rule, the regulatory component of the state law is replaced
by the regulatory component of the federal law. In contrast, unless the
federal law also creates a remedy for injured persons, remedial
preemption would not replace the compensatory component of the
displaced state remedies. In light of the importance attached to
judicial remedies by states and their citizens, we believe that courts
should be especially reluctant to find remedial preemption when the
federal law in question does not provide a substitute remedy of some
kind.71 Indeed, the elimination of all state compensatory remedies
67 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (discussing the application of economic efficiency theory to
the common law). Many different kinds of state actions have incidental regulatory effects,
including state tax laws. Unless courts construe federal statutory provisions preempting state
“requirements” or “standards” to be confined to state laws whose primary function is to regulate
private conduct, such provisions might invalidate state tax laws, even though they may be
designed primarily to enhance state revenues.
68 Thus, for example, in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the Court reasoned that
Congress declined to provide a remedy for consumers injured by misbranded drugs because it
relied on state remedies to perform that compensatory function. Id. at 1199. The Court then
observed that Congress “may also have recognized that state-law remedies further consumer
protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate
warnings.” Id. at 1199–1200.
69 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
70 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 (“Congress did not provide a federal remedy for
consumers harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs in the 1938 statute or in any subsequent
amendment.”).
71 This analysis underscores the point we made earlier concerning the Supreme Court’s
apparently greater willingness to find implied preemption than to find an implied right of action.
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text; see also MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 33
(“[I]nsofar as the federal government’s regulatory standards preempt state common law
remedies without providing an alternative compensation regime, preemption completely
eliminates the corrective justice role that common law courts have played in this country since
its founding.”). Professor McGarity adds that, in interpreting the scope of express preemption
clauses or determining the scope of implied preemption, “[t]he loss of corrective justice will
probably play strongly . . . , along with the general virtues of federalism and the back-stop
function of the common law.” Id. at 245.
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without the creation of a federal substitute may raise due process or
takings concerns.72
2. The Regulatory Effects of Judicial Remedies
Of course, state law is preempted, regardless of its purposes, if the
effect of the state law is to impede the operation of the federal law.
Thus, the purposes of state judicial remedies cannot save them from
preemption if their effects place them within the scope of an express
preemption provision or interfere with federal purposes that support
preemption. While judicial remedies do have regulatory effects,
however, those effects are less direct and immediate than those
resulting from other forms of state regulation. As a result, those
remedies are less likely to interfere with the federal regulatory
objectives. Put differently, a federal purpose (and statutory language)
that supports ceiling preemption of state regulation does not
necessarily support preemption of state remedies.73
Regulation in the form of legislative rules creates directly binding
obligations that apply across-the-board to all regulated entities. These
rules are typically enforced by means of executive or administrative
action and are subject to criminal or civil sanctions. Thus, while
regulatory violations can and do occur, including intentional
violations, it is normal and expected that regulated entities will take
immediate action to comply with legislative rules. To the extent that
the state’s regulation through legislative rules is inconsistent with the
purposes of federal regulation, the impairment of the federal purpose
from the regulation is likely great.
By way of contrast, judicial remedies are individual decisions
whose regulatory effects result from their precedential value. A
judicial decision is therefore less likely to have a direct, across-theboard regulatory impact on affected entities.74 To be sure, companies
72 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 179–85 (1985); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673
(1976) (stating that among the “historic liberties” preserved from deprivation without due
process is a right “to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security” (citing
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))); Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546,
553 (1914) (“[W]hile the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it
may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount . . .
to a taking of private property for public use.”); Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d
309 (Iowa 1998) (holding that state law barring nuisance actions against farmers who burn their
crops amounted to the taking of an easement over neighboring properties). But cf. Johnson v.
Am. Leather Specialties Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1172–76 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (holding that
state statute creating immunity from tort liability did not amount to a compensable taking).
73 See supra note 18 (arguing that the use of terms such as “standards” or “requirements”
in express preemption provisions does not necessarily include state judicial remedies).
74 Cf. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (quoting with approval the Vermont Supreme Court’s
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pay attention to litigation and the results, especially when they or
others like them are held liable (or forced to defend multiple suits) or
when damages are very large, but they do not necessarily alter their
conduct on the basis of a few successful lawsuits, since other suits
may be unsuccessful. An important factor in this regard is the
availability of insurance, which reduces the impact of successful
lawsuits, but cannot be used to soften the blow of enforcement of
legislative rules.75
To illustrate the differences between legislative rules and judicial
remedies for purposes of preemption analysis, consider the purpose of
rationalizing standards to reduce the transactions costs of interstate
distribution of goods and services. The collective action problem to
which federal preemption responds is that states may undervalue the
benefits of reducing transaction costs for businesses marketing their
products or services nationally, or that transaction costs may prevent
voluntary alignment of laws.76 If states have conflicting and
inconsistent legislative rules governing the design or marketing of a
product, then companies have little choice but to adapt the design and
sales of that product to the requirements of each state or forego
marketing and selling the product in some states.77
The question in deciding whether to preempt state judicial
remedies, or to construe ambiguous federal legislation to have that
effect, is whether retention of state judicial remedies creates the same
threat of increased transaction costs and obstacles to national product
marketing that a lack of uniformity in positive regulation does. In
light of the strong presumption against preemption of state judicial
remedies and the limited regulatory effects of judicial remedies, we
argue that a federal purpose of achieving regulatory uniformity will
not always justify preemption of state judicial remedies.78 The

observation that the jury verdict in the case did not “mandate a particular replacement
warning”).
75 Ironically, the “moral hazard” problem that is often seen as a negative effect of
insurance coverage may be a positive reason to avoid remedial preemption.
76 See supra Part I.C.2.
77 Alternatively, if state standards are performance standards rather than design standards,
companies may choose to comply with the most stringent state’s standards and market uniform
products nationally. This result would allow the state with the highest performance standards to
dictate the national standard, increasing the costs for companies and potentially exporting
regulatory burdens to other states. Another option for regulated entities is to violate legislative
rules and treat any resulting monetary penalties as a cost of doing business. Criminal fines may
be excluded from insurance coverage, however. See Andrew L. Kolesar & Jacqueline M.
Kovilaritch, Buying and Selling Brownfield Properties: A Practical Guide for Successful
Transactions, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 467, 474 (2000).
78 The analysis here does not extend to legislation that reflects Congress’s decision to
strike a particular balance between protecting public health and safety and limiting the burdens
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existence of potential tort liability in different states, unlike the
applicability of multiple state regulatory standards, is likely to be
viewed as a cost of doing business.79 That cost may be addressed by
responses other than changing the design or marketing of the product,
including insurance coverage, price increases, or contractual
responses. The interference with the goal of reducing transaction
costs is less severe than the one resulting from standards imposed by
legislative rules.
C. Extent of Remedial Preemption
Even assuming that the language and purposes of federal law
provide sufficiently clear evidence to overcome the presumption
against remedial preemption, the complete displacement of state
remedial authority will seldom be necessary to accommodate the
federal interest, and would be especially inappropriate when the
federal law provides no substitute remedy. Instead, there are likely to
be ways for state remedial law to avoid incompatibility with the
federal law.
1. Using the Federal Standard
One way to reconcile state remedies and federal law is to conform
the state remedial law to federal requirements or standards. There are
two obvious ways to do this. The first is to treat compliance with
federal law as a defense to a state tort action, to the extent that the
that regulation imposes on product manufacturers and service providers. If Congress decides
that a particular balance is optimal, and that any deviation from that balance would interfere
with the federal purposes reflected in settling on that optimal balance, then it might make sense
to preempt state tort judgments against a business in full compliance with federal standards.
Preemption in this context, however, is based on an effort to prevent states from exporting
regulatory burdens, rather than a desire to reduce transaction costs. In other words, preemption
is justified as a mechanism to prevent the export of externalities resulting from overregulation
by states of businesses located elsewhere, rather than from a desire to achieve uniform levels of
regulation to reduce transaction costs. Note, however, that Congress may seek to strike a
balance in adopting federal regulatory standards without also having a purpose to prevent states
from striking a different balance. Displacement of state authority is only justified when the
legislative purpose is to strike a single nationwide balance and to prevent disruption of that
balance from overregulation.
79 Imagine, for example, a fast food chain being held liable in tort for injuries resulting
from a spill of scalding-hot coffee. See Greene v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 416,
418 n.1 (W.D. Va. 1997) (noting a state court jury in Albuquerque, New Mexico that awarded a
woman compensatory damages and punitive damages after she was burned by coffee purchased
from a drive-through window at a McDonalds restaurant, but dismissing case involving similar
incident). The fast food chain will not relish the prospect of defending such suits, but the
possibility that it will have to do so is not likely to disrupt its efforts to market its coffee
throughout the nation, given readily available options such as lowering the temperature of the
coffee or purchasing insurance to protect it against damage awards.
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lawsuit alleges conduct that falls within the scope of the federal
regulatory regime. The second is to treat the federal law as
establishing the standard by which the liability of the defendant is to
be judged, essentially allowing the state to provide compensation for
persons injured as a result of a violation of federal law.80 The
essential difference between these two approaches is the burden of
proof. If treated as a defense, the burden would be on the defendant to
establish compliance with federal law, while treating federal law as
the applicable standard would require the plaintiff to establish a
violation.
Absent unusual circumstances, it is hard to see how either
approach would compromise federal interests, since the federal
standard is retained. Providing compensation to plaintiffs able to
prove that the defendant violated federal law might have a general
deterrent effect on regulated entities in the state providing
compensation. Such a deterrent, however, would not interfere with
the rationalization of standards, since the remedial standard would be
the same as the uniform federal standard (just as it would be under the
approach that allows compliance to serve as a defense to a state
common law tort action). Likewise, since the state remedies
incorporate federal standards, those standards are not distorted under
either approach by burden exports or NIMBY problems. In some
cases, there could be concerns that the application of the federal
standard might be affected by distorted incentives (even to the point
of jury nullification).81 Similarly, state courts might interpret and
apply federal standards differently so as to undermine uniformity and
increase transaction costs. These problems, however, are surely less
severe and commonplace than the comparable problems caused by
differing state judge-made liability standards (which are in turn less
severe than those caused by state legislative rules).
Conversely, incorporation of the federal standard would allow the
states, at least to some degree, to further the compensatory purposes
of judicial remedies. It would still prevent states from protecting their
citizens by providing a judicial forum for compensating them for
injuries caused by conduct that complies with federal standards that
the state might consider to be insufficiently protective. This concern
cautions against too readily concluding that federal laws preempt state
remedies in the sense of establishing a defense or the standard of
80 See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828 (N.D. 2006)
(involving a state remedy for alleged violations of Federal Telecommunications Act).
81 A jury might find for a local plaintiff and against an out-of-state company
notwithstanding compliance with the federal standard. Such a result could be difficult to detect
if there is a general verdict.
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liability. But if remedial preemption is called for, either approach
preserves some access to court for injured individuals, and allows the
states to protect their citizens, at least to some extent.
2. Alternative Theories
A related point is that even if preemption of some state remedies is
called for, other theories of liability may be consistent with federal
law. In other words, careful attention should be paid to whether the
theory of a given case would establish de facto regulatory standards
that would undermine the purposes of the federal statute or regulation
in question. Given the important state interests in compensating
injured citizens through judicial remedies, the scope of remedial
preemption should be no greater than necessary to protect the federal
purposes.
To illustrate this point, consider the Supreme Court’s decision in
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,82 which in many ways launched
the current debate over remedial preemption. The Supreme Court held
that a federal regulation giving automobile manufacturers the choice
of providing passive seatbelts or airbags preempted a products
liability lawsuit alleging that providing seatbelts but not airbags
constituted a design defect.83 This result makes some sense in terms
of our framework, because there are powerful reasons for
rationalizing standards for the design of automobiles to reduce
transaction costs.84 Further, courts in states that do not manufacture
automobiles may have an incentive to overregulate because the
burden is exported to other states in which the manufacture took
place.
Even if products liability cases based on this theory are preempted,
however, other theories would not necessarily conflict with federal
purposes to the same extent, and might be allowed to go forward. The
courts should analyze each theory of liability to determine whether
providing relief under that particular theory creates a conflict with
federal law. Thus, for example, in Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor
Corp.,85 a federal district court held that some claims related to
seatbelts were preempted by federal law under Geier. But it allowed
claims based on alleged defects in the design of the seat back, seat
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
Id. at 864
84 An even narrower reading of Geier would be that the recognition of liability based on
the choice to provide passive seatbelts is in direct conflict with the federal regulation permitting
that choice.
85 166 F. Supp. 2d 169 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
82
83
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track, and knee bolster to go forward.86 Claims based on the
manufacturer’s choice of seatbelts may be inconsistent with a
regulatory standard providing auto manufacturers with that choice.
But the federal standard did not address seat back, seat track, or knee
bolster design, so allowing design defect claims relating to those
components of the car to proceed did not interfere with operation of
any federal standard.87
This kind of analysis has been applied in other areas as well,
particularly with respect to claims against cigarette manufacturers.
Thus, for example, courts have determined that failure to warn claims
are preempted by federal law, but not claims based on theories such
as misrepresentation or fraud.88 Careful attention to the basis of the
state law claim helps to ensure that preemption only applies when the
regulatory effects of the claim are within the scope of any federal
purposes that support ceiling preemption. Conversely, that attention
helps to preserve the states’ fundamental interest in providing
remedies for their citizens when recognition of such remedies does
not have regulatory effects that are inconsistent with federal purposes.
III. WYETH V. LEVINE
In this section, we briefly discuss the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Wyeth v. Levine,89 which is consistent with our analysis
and serves as a useful illustration of several key points we advance
here. First, the Court (over the objections of dissenters) began with a
presumption against preemption, emphasizing the traditional role of
states’ police powers to protect the health and safety of their
citizens.90 The majority rejected the argument advanced by the
dissent—correctly in our view—“that the presumption against
pre-emption should not apply to claims of implied conflict
pre-emption at all . . . .”91 Later in the opinion, the Court also drew a
negative inference against legislative intent to preempt state judicial
Id. at 178-80.
See id.
88 See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
89 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
90 Id. at 1194–95 (“‘In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress
has “legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” . . . we “start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”’” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947))) (alterations in original)); see also id. at 1195 n.3 (“We rely on the presumption because
respect for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads us to assume that
‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.’” (quoting Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 485)).
91 Id. at 1195 n.3.
86
87
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remedies from Congress’s failure to include an express preemption
provision.92
Second, the Court distinguished between floor and ceiling
preemption, and looked for evidence of congressional intent to
displace state authority to impose more stringent standards than
required by Congress:
Wyeth contends that the FDCA establishes both a floor and a
ceiling for drug regulation: Once the FDA has approved a
drug’s label, a state-law verdict may not deem the label
inadequate, regardless of whether there is any evidence that
the FDA has considered the stronger warning at issue. The
most glaring problem with this argument is that all evidence
of Congress’ purposes is to the contrary. Building on its 1906
Act, Congress enacted the FDCA to bolster consumer
protection against harmful products.93
In this regard, the key issue appeared to be whether state remedies
would upset the balance between the benefits and burdens of
regulation struck by an expert federal agency, the FDA.94
While there was some support for this argument based on the
FDA’s statements in a regulatory preamble and in the statutory
scheme,95 the majority concluded that the language and history of the
statutory scheme reflected a primary purpose of protecting consumers
by establishing a floor, and did not support the conclusion that the
balance struck by the FDA foreclosed states from striking a different
92 Id. at 1200 (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it
surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA’s
70-year history. . . . Its silence on the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence
of state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the
exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”).
93 Id. at 1199; see also id. at 1193 (quoting Vermont Supreme Court’s conclusion that
federal warning requirements “‘create a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation’”); id. at 1200
(quoting preamble to FDA rule stating that federal requirements establish “both a ‘floor’ and a
‘ceiling,’”); id. at 1202 (describing prior FDA statements that “cast federal labeling standards as
a floor upon which States could build”); id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that
FDA may describe “when labeling requirements serve as a ceiling as well as a floor” through
specific regulations).
94 Neither the majority nor the dissent suggested a congressional purpose to rationalize
standards so as to reduce transaction costs and promote interstate commerce. Although such a
purpose might support the adoption of uniform federal standards, this purpose was apparently
not a significant factor underlying the particular federal regulatory regime at issue in Wyeth.
There would also appear to be no NIMBY problem in this context.
95 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1219 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing regulatory scheme).
Because Justice Alito, as well as Justice Scalia (who, together with Chief Justice Roberts, joined
the dissent) reject reliance on legislative history as a tool of statutory construction, the dissent
did not discuss any legislative history that might have supported its analysis.
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balance.96 This analysis is consistent with our view that only the
primary legislative purposes should be relevant to implied preemption
analysis. We would add that this conclusion makes sense in terms of
our collective action analysis because there was no suggestion by
either the drug manufacturer or the dissent of congressional concern
for the export of regulatory burdens by “downstream states” as a
result of distorted state incentives.
Third, the majority recognized the difference between state judicial
remedies and direct regulation, observing that the “the jury verdict
established only that [the] warning was insufficient. It did not
mandate a particular replacement warning, nor did it require
contraindicating” the method of drug administration approved by the
FDA.97 In addition, the Court recognized that “Congress did not
provide a federal remedy for consumers harmed by unsafe or
ineffective drugs in the 1938 statute or in any subsequent amendment.
Evidently, it determined that widely available state rights of action
provided appropriate relief for injured consumers.”98 It would be
particularly perverse if the effect of adoption of a federal statute
whose primary purpose is to protect consumers were to leave them
without a remedy for injuries suffered as a result of the use of
products regulated under the statute.99

96 Much of the discussion focused on the FDA’s argument for preemption set forth in a
regulatory preamble, and on whether it warranted deference. The majority concluded that “[t]he
weight we accord the agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends
on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.” Id. at 1201 (majority opinion) (citing
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)). Under this standard, according to the majority, the “preamble does not merit
deference” because it represented an abrupt shift in the rule as proposed without notice or
opportunity for comment and because it “is at odds with what evidence we have of Congress’
purposes, and it reverses the FDA’s own longstanding position without providing a reasoned
explanation, including any discussion of how state law has interfered with the FDA’s regulation
of drug labeling during decades of coexistence.” Id. at 1201.
97 Id. at 1194.
98 Id. at 1199. The Court referenced legislative history indicating that, as originally
proposed, the statute did provide a federal remedy, which was removed because “witnesses
testified that such a right of action was unnecessary because common-law claims were already
available under state law.” Id. at 1199 n.7 (citing Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 400, 403 (1933) (statements of W.A. Hines and J.A.
Ladds)).
99 Even the dissenters in Wyeth, however, apparently would have allowed state tort suits to
proceed, provided that they did not find liability for warnings that complied with federal
requirements. See id. at 1231 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, state tort suits can peacefully
coexist with the FDA’s labeling regime, and they have done so for decades. But this case is far
from peaceful coexistence. The FDA told Wyeth that Phenergan’s label renders its use ‘safe.’
But the State of Vermont, through its tort law, said: ‘Not so.’” (citation omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
We believe that federalism is, in many respects, a pragmatic
response to collective action problems among states. From this
perspective, collective action principles provide a powerful tool for
analyzing federalism issues, including preemption. In this Article we
have applied those principles to consider the issues raised by remedial
preemption, an increasingly important and frequently litigated issue.
Remedial preemption cases raise fundamental questions of how to
balance the national interests that support federal regulation against
the legitimate and powerful state interests in preserving access to
courts and judicial remedies for injured parties.
Our analysis suggests two essential points. First, preemption of
state remedies is a form of “ceiling preemption” that is supported only
when the primary purposes of federal regulation reflect concern that
states have an incentive to overregulate. Such primary purposes
include achieving uniform standards to reduce transactions costs,
responding to the export of regulatory burdens to other states, and
combating the NIMBY problem. Second, because state judicial
remedies differ in important respects from state legislative rules,
statutory language and purposes that support ceiling preemption of
legislative rules do not necessarily support remedial preemption. In
particular, the institutional structure of courts differs from that of
legislatures. These differences insulate judges from the political
pressures that create problematic incentives for legislatures. In
addition, the states have an important interest in providing remedies
and that interest is entitled to respect under preemption doctrine.
Finally, the regulatory effect of common law tort remedies is less than
that of legislative rules. As a result, it is often possible to
accommodate the federal purpose within the remedial jurisprudence
of the state courts without displacing that remedial authority entirely.
Ultimately, we do not claim that our approach will provide easy
answers to difficult preemption problems that will likely depend on
the particulars of the federal statute and the state remedies at issue.
We do believe, however, that our approach focuses on the right
questions.

